September 11: the return of reality
On September 11, 2001, at 8:46 AM, a hijacked Boeing 767 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Seventeen minutes later, a second plane strikes the south tower. Two other planes are hijacked: one crashes into the Pentagon; the other in Pennsylvania, after the revolt of its passengers and crew. In a matter of hours, nineteen Al-Qaeda terrorists kill 2,977 people. The entire world watches the towers collapse. That day, several Western certainties shatter along with them.
Published on 11 September 2026

At 8:46 AM, a hijacked Boeing 767 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center, seventeen minutes later, a second plane strikes the south tower.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, many had been largely convinced that law, trade, and interdependence would gradually render power secondary. Globalization was supposed to bring peoples closer together. Economic openness would favor political convergence. Borders would lose their importance. War itself seemed to be progressively pushed to the margins of a pacified world. September 11 was the bloody refutation of this illusion.
Exactly three months after the attacks, on December 11, 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization. No causal link between these two events, yet their proximity sheds a peculiar light on the quarter-century that would follow.
On one side, an Islamist organization had used freedoms, technologies, financial networks, and the openness of democracies to strike at the heart of the world’s leading power. On the other side, the bet was made that China’s commercial integration would favor its political convergence with the liberal world. Alas, Beijing fully took advantage of this openness without ever renouncing a patiently developed strategy of power.
In both cases, the same utopians too willingly confused their hopes with the course of History. The response to Al-Qaeda was, of course, necessary. No state can accept that a terrorist organization prepares the massacre of its citizens with impunity. But in Afghanistan, the destruction of Al-Qaeda and its sanctuary gradually came with a much broader ambition: to rebuild a state and reshape an entire society. Twenty years after the intervention, the Taliban retook Kabul. Then the “war on terror” was extended to Iraq, according to a distinct and contested logic. The fall of Saddam Hussein was followed by chaos, sectarian war, and, a few years later, the rise of ISIS.
Military power remains indispensable. But it does not exempt one from a strategy, knowledge of the adversary, or a realistic assessment of what force can accomplish. Military superiority is not enough when it serves poorly defined or unrealistic political objectives.
While the United States concentrated a considerable part of its efforts on terrorism and the Middle East, other powers pursued their own trajectory. Russia attacked Georgia in 2008, annexed Crimea in 2014, and then invaded Ukraine in 2022. China became a leading industrial, technological, digital, maritime, and military power. Iran extended its influence in the Middle East. Turkey returned to an imperialist logic. The United States itself gradually returned to a more directly strategic conception of trade and technological relations.
If some had forgotten them or closed their eyes, the balance of power has never disappeared from the international scene. And while European leaders went so far as to ban the very word “power,” others ensured they could exercise it.
Today, the balance of power is no longer measured solely in soldiers, tanks, or warships. It plays out in industry, energy, raw materials, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, cyberspace, data, critical infrastructures, the standards one manages to impose on others, and the major trade routes. Economic dependence can become a strategic vulnerability. A new technology, an energy resource, or a supply chain that one controls can become instruments of pressure. Sovereignty thus takes on a very concrete meaning. It is not about proclaiming independence. It requires having the material means to decide freely and, when our interests demand it, to be able to say no.
September 11 left us with another lesson, particularly painful for France. In 2001, we discovered a terrorist organization with a distant rear base capable of preparing for months an unprecedented operation. Twenty-five years later, the Islamist threat has profoundly changed. Since 2012, more than 270 people have been murdered on our soil by Islamist terrorism. Toulouse and Montauban, Charlie Hebdo, the Hyper Cacher, the Bataclan, Nice, Magnanville, Samuel Paty, Dominique Bernard: these names now belong to our national history.
Jihadism no longer necessarily needs a territorial sanctuary or an organization capable of preparing a complex operation over several years. Radicalization can occur in a prison, on a social network, or in contact with a few individuals. The threat has fragmented, individualized, it has become endogenous, without losing its lethal capacity.
But terrorism does not exhaust the question of Islamism. Jihadism constitutes its armed form, the most spectacular and deadly. There is also a political Islam that takes other paths: influence, networks, education, preaching, entryism, social intimidation. Its methods can differ profoundly from those of terrorism. This does not make its project any less dangerous. Islamism is not only a threat when it kills. It is also a threat when it seeks to push back common law in favor of religious norms.
It is therefore necessary to combat each of its manifestations with the means that correspond to it: through intelligence, police, and justice when it prepares, encourages, or justifies violence; through law, education, public authority, and the uncompromising defense of our principles when it advances through influence, pressure, or entryism. Naming it for what it is does not mean confusing Islam with Islamism, nor suspecting French Muslims who reject this political enterprise and can be victims of it like anyone else. On the contrary, it is the condition for a clear fight. In France, no religious prescription can prevail over common law. This internal requirement directly aligns with the great transformation of the world. For a nation cannot be powerful abroad if it doubts itself at home.
Power does not reside solely in military capabilities. It requires knowing how to defend one’s borders and interests, produce the essential goods for independence, control essential infrastructures, maintain a scientific and technological lead, educate its children, enforce its laws, and transmit a common history, language, and culture.
It also requires knowing what one intends to defend. Europe had believed it could live sustainably off the dividends of peace. It now discovers the urgency of rearmament. France, for its part, still has considerable assets: nuclear deterrence, a permanent seat on the Security Council, a global maritime presence, diplomacy present on all continents, a leading defense industry, and armies recognized worldwide. But power is never merely the simple addition of available means. It requires political will, strategic continuity, and a clear hierarchy of interests.
Twenty-five years later, this may be the true political significance of September 11, 2001. The duty of memory first commands us to remember the thousands of lives destroyed that day and all those that Islamist terrorism has claimed since, in the United States, France, and elsewhere. But memory only makes sense if it makes us more lucid. September 11 was not the beginning of violence, Islamism, or power rivalries. It was the moment when certain Western illusions brutally collided with reality.
Since then, reality has continually reminded us of itself. Islamism has changed form without disappearing. High-intensity warfare has returned to Europe. Empires and powers are asserting their ambitions. Industry, energy, technology, raw materials, and information have become weapons. Law remains indispensable, but it only protects those who have the necessary force to enforce it. Our leaders have long believed that power belonged to the old world. It is, on the contrary, one of the great questions of the coming world. The real question now is whether France still accepts to be the author of its destiny or whether it gradually consents to see it written by others. For a nation that renounces power always ends up depending on others. And a nation that depends on others soon no longer decides its destiny. France therefore does not have to choose between freedom and power. It must regain the power necessary to remain free.
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